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Abstract
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is a paradigm used to model and measure social cooperation.
Uncooperative behavior may be one manifestation of the unstable interpersonal functioning in
psychopathy. I investigated the effect of opponent strategy as well as psychopathic traits of
fearless dominance (FD) and impulsive antisociality (IA) on cooperation rates and total and
competitive point gains in a sample of 177 undergraduates playing long, finitely iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma games against computerized opponents who varied in their interpersonal
styles from very harsh to very lenient. I analyzed rates of cooperation during each game,
participants’ total points gained, and the difference in points earned between participant and
opponent (competitive point gain). These variables were analyzed across the experiment overall
and across trials after either participant or computer cooperation or defection on the previous
trial. Across the experiment overall, there was significantly less cooperation and total and
competitive point gains in the second half compared to the first half of each opponent block of
trials, there was a positive association with leniency of opponent strategy and cooperation and
total and competitive point gains, and there was a negative association with inconsistent
opponent conditions and total and competitive point gains. However, opposing patterns emerged
for each when comparing after cooperation and defection on the previous trial. For psychopathy,
there were no effects of computer opponent’s strategy on these three variables. In the second half
of each block of trials, those higher in FD tended to score more total points. Implications and
future directions are discussed.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The Influence of Opponent Strategy and Psychopathic Traits on Point Gains and Cooperation in
the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD; Luce & Raiffa, 1957) game is a social dilemma paradigm
that is used to model and measure social cooperation. In a traditional PD, Player A is given the
scenario in which they and a partner (Player B) were arrested for a crime. They are taken into
separate rooms for interrogation without the possibility of communication and are given an
opportunity to remain silent (cooperate) or testify against their partner (defect). A payoff matrix
(see Figure 1) is given such that if both Player A and Player B remain silent (mutual
cooperation), then each receives one year in prison. If both Player A and Player B testify against
their partner (mutual defection), each receives three years in prison. If Player A testifies
(defection) and Player B remains silent (cooperation), Player A receives zero years in prison and
Player B receives five years in prison. If Player A remains silent (cooperation) and Player B
testifies (defection), then Player A receives five years and Player B receives zero years in prison.

Figure 1. Payoff matrix of the traditional PD game framed as avoiding jail time.
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However, because administering meaningful punishments to participants is difficult to do
in ethical laboratory settings, PD games often involve gaining points or some other reward.
Fortunately, results for PD games seem similar whether framed as rewards or punishments (de
Heus, Hoogervorst, & Dijk, 2010). A true PD game requires that the greatest reward is for
defection while the opponent cooperates (T), the second greatest reward is for mutual
cooperation (R), the second smallest reward is for mutual defection (P), and the smallest reward
is for cooperation while the opponent defects (S). This array of rewards ensures that defection is
the most potentially rewarding option for an individual player. Iterated PD games must also have
the points distributed such that 2*R > T + S to ensure that the most points allotted across
participants is R, mutual cooperation.
Interdependence theory proposes that interdependent interactions are a combined
function of three major influences: structural influences (e.g., the PD game, one-shot vs. iterated,
finite vs. infinite iterated, gain-loss framing, payoff matrix, etc.), interpersonal influences (e.g.,
social dynamics, use of or reaction to an employed strategy, etc.) and individual difference
influences (e.g., player motives, affect, personality, etc.; Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & Van
Dijk, 2013). This theory considers the transformation of the given structure by the players into a
matrix of subjective outcomes that accounts for these influences and is more closely linked to
real-world behavior. The “given matrix” is the short-term self-interest based on the given
structure as well as the individual’s needs and skills. The “effective matrix” accounts for
interpersonal (i.e., weighing individual vs. mutual interests) and temporal (i.e., weighing shortterm vs. long-term interest) concerns, long-term consequences of actions, individual differences,
and cognitive/affective states (e.g., priming, mood, etc.). Features of the situation, interpersonal
dynamics and demands, as well as the individual player differences can promote an array of
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behavioral motivations and outcomes (e.g., self-control, concern with future consequences,
encouraging cooperation/defection, forgiveness, etc.; Van Lange et al., 2013). Players in PD
games consistently battle the tension between the shorter-term competitive incentive of defection
and long-term gains of cooperation.
Structural Influences
One-shot versus iterated PD. PD games can be either one-shot or iterated. In one-shot
games, there is only one trial played against an opponent in a game paradigm. In a one-shot PD
game, defection is the dominant strategy as it carries the highest reward whether the opponent
cooperates or defects (Jurišić, Kermek, & Konecki, 2012). This structure could be used to
investigate behavior when a relationship is brief and the opponent need not concern themselves
with consequences of their actions in any continued interpersonal interactions. In iterated games,
there is more than one trial with an opponent; thus, one’s interactions on any trial besides the
final one will theoretically affect the social interaction that occurs on subsequent trials. Iterated
games better approximate real-world social situations such as interpersonal relationships,
emotional responses to behavior, and manipulative or naïve strategies (Press & Dyson, 2012).
In an infinitely repeated iterated PD games, cooperative strategies are more successful
(Jurišić et al., 2012) as mutual cooperation tends to develop over time (Barlow & Tsang, 2015)
due to the contribution of several contextual mechanisms (e.g., direct reciprocity, indirect
reciprocity, spatial selection, multilevel selection, kin selection; Rand & Nowak, 2013). In
finitely repeated iterated PD games (i.e., set number of rounds with a known end) the dominant
response is to always defect (Barlow & Tsang, 2015). There will eventually be a round without
the possibility of retribution for defection and backwards induction unravels trials before it.
Cooperation could afford a significant reward (e.g., RA, RB, see Figure 1) but carries with it risk
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(e.g., SA, TB) of the least rewarding outcome and does not allow for the possibility of the greatest
individual reward (e.g., TA, SB). Given these risks and the potential benefit of a round without the
possibility of retribution, defection is the dominant response even in these finitely repeated
iterated PD games. Even so, individuals appear to perceive longer finite iterated PD games as
infinite in games between 25-50 iterations (Barlow & Tsang, 2015) in which the most adaptive
strategy is again cooperation given the reward potential for mutual cooperation and the
contextual pressures that promote it.
Human versus computer interactions. Many researchers fail to address potential
differences between human-human and human-computer interactions. However, recent
experimental literature has shown that in a finitely repeated PD game participants tended to
cooperate more with human opponents compared to robots yet they showed no significant
difference in the amount of reciprocity between human and robot opponents (Sandoval,
Brandstetter, Obaid, & Bartneck, 2016). This suggests that while human-human interactions may
elicit more cooperation, the norm of reciprocity appears to be consistent across human-human
and human-robot interactions supporting the valid use of human-computer interactions in finitely
repeated PD games.
Interpersonal Influences
Strategy: Tit-for-tat. There is a vast literature on iterated PD games and a variety of
ways to characterize strategy in such games. In Axelrod's (1980a, 1980b) classic studies, he
conducted two round-robin style tournaments with leaders in game theory research from several
disciplines who each entered a programmed strategy in an attempt to find the most successful
one in the iterated PD. The winner (i.e., highest average score across rounds) of the tournaments
was tit-for-tat (TFT; cooperates on the first trial then always copies the opponent’s move on the
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previous trial), which was subsequently considered the strategy that was most robustly successful
in promoting social cooperation and represents the social norm of reciprocity. However, Axelrod
emphasizes that TFT cannot be considered the most superior strategy as no rule can be
considered best independent of the environment. Instead, he suggested that TFT appeared to be a
robustly successful strategy across environments. Sandoval et al. (2016) also found that
participants reciprocated and cooperated more with a TFT strategy compared to a random
strategy in both human-human and human-computer interactions, further supporting Axelrod’s
assumption that TFT represents the social norm of reciprocity and can be applied to humancomputer interactions as well. Additionally, this norm of reciprocity is often considered
culturally universal though it has been shown to be stronger in some cultures (e.g., collectivistic
cultures) than others (e.g., individualistic cultures; Brett & Kopelman, 2004; Shen, Wan, &
Wyer, 2011).
Properties of successful strategies. Axelrod (1980a, 1980b) also proposed several
properties of successful (i.e., based on most points earned) strategies in iterated PD games. First,
niceness alone was found to distinguish between the high scoring from the low scoring
strategies. A strategy is considered “nice” if it will not be the first to defect, or at least not before
the last few moves. Additionally, nice strategies avoid unnecessary conflict by cooperating as
long as the other player does (Axelrod, 1984). Another key property is forgiveness, which is
defined as the strategy’s tendency to cooperate in the trials after their opponent has defected. For
example, TFT can be characterized as punishing for one move but then forgiving of an isolated
defection as it returns to cooperation immediately after the opponent does. In other words, it
forgives a single defection instead of punishing by continuing to defect. Another property is
provocability which is defined as a strategy that immediately defects after their opponent defects
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when it is considered “uncalled for,” otherwise risking being taken advantage of. TFT is an
example of a provocable strategy such that it will defect immediately following an opponent’s
defection. Finally, clarity is another property of successful strategy such that the strategy’s
behavior must be clear to allow the other player to adapt to that strategic pattern (Axelrod, 1984).
If a strategy lacks clarity or is inconsistent, it is possible that the opponent will not be able to
properly adjust their own strategy which may lead to unideal outcomes (e.g., defection spirals)
for both players. In addition, Axelrod proposes that “the effectiveness of a particular strategy
depends not only on its own characteristics, but also on the nature of the other strategies with
which it must interact” (1980a, p. 21) and that an effective strategy must take into account of the
entire dyadic history of interactions as they have developed from the beginning.
Criticisms of Axelrod’s tournaments and TFT. A recent review of iterated PD
strategies (Jurišić et al., 2012) suggests that Axelrod’s basic properties for successful strategies
appear to remain valid. However, recent literature has also criticized the findings regarding TFT
as the most robust and successful iterated PD strategy such that it ignores past game history
beyond the last trial, it can never “win” in any particular iterated PD game or gain a positive
point difference, and is likely only successful when faced with a particular set of success criteria,
payoff matrix, and tournament format (Rapoport, Seale, & Colman, 2015). Additionally, while
TFT has been lauded as important for the evolution of cooperation, it does not necessarily appear
to be an evolutionarily stable strategy in long-term iterations such that it is not immune to
invasion by an initially rare alternative strategy (Lorberbaum, Bohning, Shastri, & Sine, 2002).
In human interactions, noise/error and boredom (e.g., human participants achieving mutual
cooperation for an extended period and then defecting to “see what happens”; Axelrod, 2012)
come into play and game theorists have long proposed generosity (i.e., allowing some amount of
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opponent defections to go unpunished) as a successful way to cope with noise and prevent
defection spirals (Wu & Axelrod, 1995). Generous strategies counter Axelrod’s proposed
property of provocability.
Stochastic strategies reflect an agent’s tendency to decide based upon previous
interactions as well as incorporate randomness and chance. Axelrod’s tournaments used
deterministic rules with a choice of cooperation or defection in every trial as a function only of
the history of interactions in a maximum of the three trials prior. Deterministic rules are not
necessarily the best approximation of real human behavior such that humans are prone to error,
short memories, and/or uncertain motives, interpretations, and decisions (Nowak & Sigmund,
1992). Instead, stochastic (not deterministic) strategies reflect a better simulation of human
behavior. Additionally, Axelrod suggested that TFT is the best strategy for eliciting cooperation
from his tournament results using a homogeneous sample of game-theoretic experts.
One study using stochastic strategies as well as a more representative, heterogeneous
sample of implemented strategies (n = 100) than was used in Axelrod’s tournaments found that
TFT is not robust once errors occur and can give rise to defection spirals (Nowak & Sigmund,
1992). They concede that TFT can still promote the emergence of reciprocation but appears most
successful when it paves the way for more generous strategies in iterated PD games. They found
that a “generous TFT” (GTFT; equivalent to TFT except it cooperates with a probability of q
when opponent defects; in Nowak & Sigmund, 1992, q = ⅓) was optimal such that it afforded
the highest payoff and was immune to inciting defection spirals by less cooperative opponent
strategies. Other studies have additionally found that more biologically successful and robust
strategies are more generous (Grim, 1996; Nowak, 1990) or more forgiving (Beaufils, Jean-Paul,
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& Mathieu, 1996; O’ Riordan, 2000) than TFT, as well as other strategies such as Pavlov winstay lose-shift (Nowak & Sigmund, 1993).
A review of the effect of preprogrammed strategies on cooperation in PD games
highlights the fact that the effect of computerized strategies do not exist in a vacuum by
suggesting that “programmed strategies often interact with other variables, such as trials, length
of initial strategies, matrix values, and subjects’ diagnostic classification to produce delayed
effects on cooperation” (Oskamp, 1971, p. 256). Thus, given the intricacies of the particular set
of success criteria, payoff matrix, tournament format, and other criteria, the question of what
strategies will most effectively elicit social cooperation in iterated PD games remains
inconclusive (Rapoport et al., 2015).
Evolution of cooperation in humans. Several mechanisms have been proposed that
promote the development of cooperation in humans (Rand & Nowak, 2013) one of which is
direct reciprocity. Direct reciprocity results from repeated encounters between individuals, as is
seen in a two-agent iterated PD game, where behavior both depends on previous trials and affects
future trials. This suggests that patterns of behavior can emerge based upon behaviors in
previous trials. Furthermore, a review of experimental data from four papers using stochastic
game theoretic models suggests that dyadic cooperation is significantly predicted by the extent to
which the probability of future interactions outweighs the riskiness of the interaction and payoff
(Rand & Nowak, 2013, p. 4). Repeated interactions between individuals promote the evolution
of cooperation even in finitely repeated PD games that are longer (Barlow & Tsang, 2015).
Axelrod (1984) highlighted the importance of opponent and participant strategy as a
factor that can promote cooperation in iterated PD games, particularly TFT. However, there have
been mixed findings regarding the evolution of cooperation when comparing cooperation in the
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beginning of a set of trials in iterated PD games to later trials. TFT has been experimentally
shown to be associated with promoting greater cooperation in later sets of trials compared to
beginning sets of trials (Sheldon, 1999) and several studies have highlighted the importance of
early cooperation as they found it is associated with later cooperation (Komorita & Mechling,
1967; Pilisuk, Potter, Rapoport, & Winter, 1965; Sermat, 1967; Terhune, 1968). However, other
studies found that competitive play, rather than cooperation, in the preliminary trials in iterated
PD games was associated with more cooperation in later trials (Bixenstine & Wilson, 1963;
Harford & Solomon, 1967; Scodel, 1962; Swingle, 1968; Wilson, 1971). Perhaps it is dependent
upon the structural or interpersonal task condition (e.g., payoff matrix, PD format, opponent
strategy, etc.) such that early cooperation may be best for facilitating participant cooperation
under some conditions, whereas under others, early double-crossing may set the stage for
cooperation later (Wilson, 1971).
Individual Difference Influences
Interdependence Theory suggests that individual differences on an array of factors can
affect decision making and PD cooperation and game outcomes. Previous studies have found that
Big Five Agreeableness (Kagel & McGee, 2014), internal locus of control, high self-monitoring,
and high sensation seeking are associated with cooperative behavior in iterated PD games,
whereas Type-A behavior tended to decrease the likelihood of cooperation (Boone, De
Brabander, & van Witteloostuijn, 1999). Cooperation is also bred over time through repetition
and learning as players improve their understanding of the subtle interplay between self-interest
and cooperation. Personality features (e.g., internal locus of control) have been associated with
quicker such learning in iterated PD games (Boone et al., 2002). Psychopathology and
personality disorders are other factors that can influence decision making. Psychopathy is one
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such personality disorder that has been shown to affect cooperation in PD games (Berg,
Lilienfeld, & Waldman, 2013; Gervais, Kline, Ludmer, George, & Manson, 2013; Mokros et al.,
2008; Rilling et al., 2007; Yamagishi, Li, Takagishi, Matsumoto, & Kiyonari, 2014).
Psychopathy. Psychopathy is a disorder characterized by antisocial behavior, emotional
impairments (e.g., lack of empathy, fearlessness), and interpersonal deficits (e.g.,
manipulativeness, violation of social norms). One model of psychopathy considers two
orthogonal factors derived from the Psychopathic Personality Inventory – Revised (PPI-R;
Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996): fearless dominance (FD) and impulsive antisociality (IA). FD is
characterized by an immunity to stress, lack of fear response, and an ability to charm/influence
others. IA is characterized by a lack of planfulness or consideration of consequences, inability to
take responsibility for one’s actions, and a disregard for social norms (Benning, Patrick, Hicks,
Blonigen, & Krueger, 2003). These factors have also been shown to have opposing associations
with interpersonal constructs (Benning et al., 2003; Patrick, Edens, Poythress, Lilienfeld, &
Benning, 2006) including social cooperation.
Studies investigating social cooperation in psychopathy using one-shot PD games have
yielded somewhat inconsistent results (Berg et al., 2013; Gervais et al., 2013; Mokros et al.,
2008; Rilling et al., 2007; Yamagishi et al., 2014). Men from a relatively wealthy Tokyo suburb
who played three distinct one-shot PD games and defected across all three games were defined
as exemplars of Homo economicus, or people who maximize their self-interest without
considering others (Yamagishi et al., 2014). In comparison to other groups of participants, these
Homo economicus individuals – who never cooperated – scored high on FD and low on the
carefree nonplanfulness PPI-R subscale (which loads onto IA). This suggests that those high in
FD may tend to defect more often overall, whereas the cognitively impulsive portion of IA may
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be associated with cooperation. In a one-shot PD game with a sample of English female
university students, Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP; Levenson, Kiehl, &
Fitzpatrick, 1995) Factor 2 scores, which measure the aggressive and impulsive characteristics of
psychopathy, were associated with greater profit in the game because they were associated with
receiving more cooperation from their human opponents (Gervais et al., 2013). Overall, these
results suggest that impulsive and antisocial psychopathic traits might paradoxically be
associated with both cooperation and successfully eliciting cooperation from other people
whereas FD may be associated with defection in one-shot games.
In a sample of male undergraduates playing three distinct one-shot PD games, PPI-R
fearlessness scores (which loads onto FD) were related to taking advantage of others’
cooperation by defecting while expecting their opponents to cooperate (Curry, Chesters, &
Viding, 2011). Additionally, those high in stress immunity (which loads onto FD) were less
likely to reciprocate cooperation, which is congruent with the findings of FD indexing Homo
economicus who never cooperated. Those high in Machiavellian egocentricity (which loads onto
IA) also cooperated less and were less likely to initiate or reciprocate cooperation (Curry et al.,
2011). However, carefree nonplanfulness and impulsive nonconformity (both load onto IA) were
not associated with lower levels of cooperation and those high in blame externalization (which
loads onto IA) were more likely to initiate cooperation. These mixed findings regarding
subscales related to IA again suggests a potential paradoxical relationship between impulsive and
antisocial psychopathic traits and cooperation in one-shot PD games.
Four studies have investigated psychopathy’s effects on behavior in an iterated PD game.
IA correlated negatively with the number of cooperations across 10 PD trials using a TFT
computer opponent, but FD did not (Berg et al., 2013). In a sample of German high-security
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psychiatric patients playing against a forgiving, generous (tit-for-two tats) computer opponent,
PPI-R Machiavellian egocentricity and impulsive nonconformity (both load onto IA) correlated
negatively with cooperation (Mokros et al., 2008). In addition, individuals high in psychopathic
traits earned a significantly higher reward than did controls. In a community sample playing
against a computer opponent using TFT, total and factor 1 scores on the LSRP in men (but not
women) correlated negatively with cooperation (Rilling et al., 2007). Additionally, total LSRP
scores and LSRP Factor 1 scores for men (but not women) were negatively correlated with
cooperation after a mutually cooperative interaction on the previous trial, but there were no
significant results for PPI-R total scores or FD.
Finally, in groups of primary and secondary psychopaths from a maximum security
hospital in England selected as psychopaths using the works of Cleckley (1941) and Hare (1970),
as well as a control group, there were no differences between groups’ predispositions to
cooperate in an iterated version of PD of 30 trials played against human opponents matched on
psychopathy types (Widom, 1976). Widom suggested that over time, psychopaths may tend to
cooperate if the stakes are high enough. Also, secondary psychopaths (who evidenced anxiety in
their psychodiagnostic files) and controls showed an increase in the probability of cooperation
after a trial of mutual cooperation during trials with communication, while primary psychopaths
(lacking fear and empathy in their psychodiagnostic profiles) showed a decrease in this
probability. Widom (1976) concluded that the behavior of individuals with psychopathic traits
may be influenced by situational demands that might impact their motivation. Thus, these
psychopathy factors akin to FD and IA appear to relate in opposite directions to social
cooperation in PD games with a large number of trials.
Current Study
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Overall, there are an array of structural, interpersonal, and individual difference
influences that can affect gains and cooperation in PD games. The current study investigates
social cooperation and gains in a series of finitely iterated PD games. The structural factors of
these PD games remained constant to investigate the effects of interpersonal and individual
difference factors. I aimed to investigate human participants’ reactive and strategic behavior
patterns in response to computerized opponent strategies that were manipulated to represent
interpersonal styles ranging from very harsh to very lenient. These opponent strategies are nice
(i.e., always cooperate on the first trial) and vary parametrically in their forgivingness (i.e., the
degree to which they punish or forgive defections by returning or not returning to cooperation
immediately), provocability (i.e., immediately defect or continue to cooperate in the face of a
player’s defection), and clarity (i.e., consistent or inconsistent employment of strategy). Harsher
strategies are provocable and range in their punitiveness, whereas lenient strategies are forgiving
and range in their generosity. The current study also aimed to investigate the effect of individual
differences in psychopathic traits on reactive and strategic patterns of cooperation and gains in
iterated PD games against this range of Harsh-Lenient and Consistent-Inconsistent computerized
opponent strategies. Previous studies using iterated PD games and a computerized opponent to
study psychopathy have used TFT or forgiving, generous strategies to control for participants’
behavior that might represent a reaction to provocation (Mokros et al., 2008).
To investigate if participants’ behavior was based on their own strategy and/or in reaction
to their opponents’ behavior I examined “cooperation” (participant’s decision to cooperate or
defect on each trial), “total point gain” (participant score on each trial) in the experiment overall,
and “competitive point gain” (difference between participant and opponent scores on each trial)
in the first and second half of each experimental block (against each opponent). I also
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investigated these variables on the next trial after participant or computer cooperations and
defections along with their association with psychopathic traits. I analyzed data separately from
the first and second half of each game block to investigate development of behavior; in
particular, whether participants become more strategic in their behavior after probing their
opponent’s strategy.
Significant effects in the experiment overall were decomposed to examine the influences
of previous behavior patterns of gain and behavior on subsequent trials. Effects after
participant’s own behavior on the previous trial should represent strategic patterns of participant
behavior, whereas effects after computer behavior on the previous trial represent patterns of
participants’ reactions patterns to their opponents’ behavior. Though Rilling et al. (2007)
investigated the probability that subjects would choose to cooperate after a mutually cooperative
outcome on the previous trial, no known studies investigating PD games with psychopathy have
reported findings on patterns of behavior based on cooperation or defection of the participants’
themselves or their computer opponents on the previous trial.
Hypotheses
The strongest hypotheses for this study (either based on previous literature or the
structure of the task itself) are displayed in italics.
Interpersonal.
1. Following suggestions that more generous (Grim, 1996; Nowak, 1990; Nowak &
Sigmund, 1992; Wu & Axelrod, 1995) and more forgiving (Beaufils et al., 1996;
O’ Riordan, 2000) strategies are more successful in promoting cooperation, there
would be a positive linear relationship between leniency of strategies and both a)
cooperation and b) total point gain, as diagrammed in Figure 2A.
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Because both mutual cooperation and mutual defection represent a competitive
point gain of zero, the expected positive linear relationship between leniency of
strategy and cooperation entails that c) there would be a quadratic relationship
between competitive point gain and opponent Harshness-Leniency such that
extreme strategies have lower competitive point gain than less extreme strategies,
as diagrammed in Figure 2A.
2. Given Axelrod’s (1984) suggestion that clarity is a necessary property for a
successful strategy, less clear (inconsistent) strategies would incite a) less
cooperation and b) lower total point gain but c) will have no relationship with
competitive point gain, as diagrammed in Figure 2B.
3. Because lenient strategies are defined by always rewarding returning to
cooperation, whereas harsh strategies do not always immediately reward returning
to cooperation, there would be a positive linear relationship between leniency of
strategies and cooperation after participant cooperation on the previous trial, as
diagrammed in Figure 2C.
4. Because harsh strategies are defined by always punishing defection, whereas
lenient strategies do not always punish defection and are vulnerable to being taken
advantage of, there would be a negative linear relationship between leniency of
strategies and cooperation after participant defection on the previous trial, as
diagrammed in Figure 2C.
5. Given that generous strategies promote cooperation (Grim, 1996; Nowak, 1990;
Nowak & Sigmund, 1992; Wu & Axelrod, 1995) but harsh strategies may
promote reactive aggression, there would be a positive linear relationship between
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leniency of strategy and cooperation after computer cooperation on the previous
trial, as diagrammed in Figure 2C.
6. Given that lenient strategies will relatively rarely defect to promote cooperation
(Grim, 1996; O’ Riordan, 2000) but harsh strategies would defect more often and
may promote reactive defection spirals (Nowak & Sigmund, 1992), there would
be a positive linear relationship between leniency of strategies and cooperation
after computer defection on the previous trial, as diagrammed in Figure 2C.
7. Given the mixed findings regarding the importance of cooperation or
competitiveness in early trials in promoting cooperation in later trials, I expect to
see an interaction between Block Half and opponent Harshness-Leniency such
that lenient strategies would show an greater increase in a) cooperation and b)
total point gain in the second half whereas harsh strategies would show a greater
decrease in c) cooperation and d) total point gain in the second half, as
diagrammed in Figure 2D.
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Figure 2. Diagrammed interpersonal hypotheses (e.g., Hypotheses 1-7).

Individual differences.
8. Across the entire experiment a) following Berg et al. (2013), Mokros et al. (2008),
and Yamagishi et al. (2014), FD and IA would correlate negatively with
participant cooperation; b) consistent with Curry et al. (2011), FD would
correlate positively with competitive point gain, but IA would not; c) consistent
with Gervais et al., (2013), IA would correlated positively with total point gain;
(as diagrammed in Figure 3A) and d) because the most extreme conditions may
promote defection (that is, more lenient opponents would continue cooperating
after defections and more harsh opponents would engender defection spirals) for
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FD and IA, they would be more negatively correlated with cooperation in very
harsh and very lenient strategy conditions (as diagrammed in Figure 3B).
9. After participant cooperation on the previous trial, a) building on Rilling et al.
(2007)’s results for LSRP Factor 1, FD would correlate negatively with
cooperation after the participant cooperated on the previous trial and b) consistent
with Widom (1976)’s findings for secondary psychopathy, IA would correlate
positively with cooperation, as diagrammed in Figure 3C.

Figure 3. Diagrammed individual differences hypotheses (e.g., Hypotheses 8-9).
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Chapter 2: Method
Participants
Participants were 177 undergraduate students from Vanderbilt University who
participated for course credit. Participants were excluded from the analyses if they were unable
to complete the experiment due to computer malfunction (n = 11) or if their personality data
were incomplete (n = 3) or invalid due to random or acquiescent responding (Benning &
Freeman, 2017; n = 2). Thus, 161 participants were included in all analyses. The mean age was
19.8 years (SD = 2.41). The sample was 50.9% female, 38.7% male, and 10.4% did not respond.
They were 62.6% Caucasian, 11.0% Black/African American, 1.2% American Indian/Alaska
Native, 11.7% Asian/Pacific Islander, 6.1% Spanish/Hispanic/Latino, and 10.4% did not
respond.
Prisoner’s Dilemma Task.
Participants played nine PD game “blocks” against different randomized computer
opponents. Each PD game block consisted of 30 trials, though the participants were unaware of
how many trials were in each block. They were shown one of 10 forward-facing neutral faces
from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (actors AF06, AF07, AM08, AM10, AM13,
AF11, AF17, AF19, AM14, and AM18) that depicted their opponent at the beginning of each
block. They were told that they would play against a computer who would behave based on the
strategies used by previous human players. At the beginning of the task, participants were told to
both a) win as many points as they could and b) win more points than each opponent. Within
participants, a different actor was presented for each opponent strategy condition; across
participants, actors were paired randomly with opponent strategy conditions. Each block used
one opponent strategy condition.
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Participants were told that they were being paired against various opponents in a
traditional “prisoner’s dilemma” scenario and may choose to either cooperate or defect on each
trial. They were informed of the payout matrix (see Figure 4) for each combination of
participant-opponent behavior. If the participant defected and the opponent cooperated, the
participant earned five points (TP = 5) and the opponent earned zero points (SO = 0). If both
participant and opponent mutually cooperated, they both earned three points (RP = 3; RO = 3). If
both participant and opponent mutually defected, they both earned one point (PP = 1; PO = 1). If
the participant cooperated and the opponent defected, the participant earned zero points (SP = 0)
and the opponent earned five points (TO = 5).

Figure 4. Payoff matrix of PD task.

Each computer opponent condition used one of nine strategies, each assigned to a block
in random order. Strategies varied parametrically on both forgivingness and provocability to
create a dimension of interpersonal Harshness-Leniency that would maximize the psychological
effect of the manipulation. They also varied in clarity to investigate the effect of strategy
consistency-inconsistency. The strategies were consistent very harsh (three tits-for-tat; once the
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participant defects, the computer will also continue to defect until the participant cooperates
three times in a row), inconsistently very harsh (two to three tits-for-tat; once the participant
defects, the computer will also continue to defect until the participant cooperates two to three
times in a row), consistent mildly harsh (two tits-for-tat; once the participant defects, the
computer will also continue to defect until the participant cooperates two times in a row),
inconsistently mildly harsh (one to two tits-for-tat; once the participant defects, the computer will
also continue to defect until the participant cooperates one to two times in a row), inconsistently
mildly lenient (tit-for-one to two tats; the computer will continue to cooperate until the
participant defects one to two times and will switch back to cooperation if the participant
cooperates), consistent mildly lenient (tit-for-two tats; the computer will continue to cooperate
until the participant defects two times and will switch back to cooperation if the participant
cooperates), inconsistently very lenient (tit-for-two to three tats; the computer will continue to
cooperate until the participant defects two to three to two times and will switch back to
cooperation if the participant cooperates), and consistent very lenient (tit-for-three tats; the
computer will continue to cooperate until the participant defects three times and will switch back
to cooperation if the participant cooperates). TFT (computer decision on each trial copies the
participant’s decision on the previous trial) were excluded from analyses, as it was neither harsh
nor lenient and so did not fit within the analytic strategy or aim of the study.
After completing each condition, participants were asked to rate their emotional valence
and arousal from 1 (lowest valence or arousal) to 9 (highest valence or arousal) using the SelfAssessment Manikin (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994). At the end of the experiment, participants
reported what fraction of the time they used a strategy to win the most points and to defeat their
opponents by most points possible.
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Measures
Demographics. Participants reported on their age, gender, race/ethnicity,
medical/physical and psychiatric difficulties, medications, marital status, family history,
educational status, and employment status.
Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire – Brief Form (MPQ-BF; Patrick,
Curtin, & Tellegen, 2002). The MPQ-BF is a 155 self-report measure of normal-range
personality with 11 primary trait scales (i.e., Wellbeing, Social Potency, Achievement, Social
Closeness, Stress Reaction, Alienation, Aggression, Control, Harm Avoidance, Traditionalism,
and Absorption) which was used to estimate FD (primarily from Social Potency, Stress Reaction,
and Harm Avoidance) and IA (primarily from Social Closeness, Alienation, Aggression, Control,
and Traditionalism) using regression equations from Benning et al. (2003). The MPQ-BF
estimates PPI factors with good precision (multiple Rs > .7; Benning et al., 2003) with
essentially identical correlation patterns (Benning, Patrick, Blonigen, Hicks, & Iacono, 2005) and
information levels about psychopathy (Walton, Roberts, Krueger, Blonigen, & Hicks, 2008) as
the PPI. Cronbach αs in the current sample ranged from .74 (Traditionalism) to .86 (Stress
Reaction) for the primary trait scales. This sample had higher scores on FD and IA compared to
the MPQ normative sample. Their FD and IA scores were relatively similar to those of federal
inmates; compared to a state inmate sample, their FD scores were higher, but their IA scores
were lower (see Benning et al., in press, for further details).
Procedures
Each participant completed the experiment in a single session. After completing an
informed consent, participants were asked to answer the demographics questionnaire and the
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MPQ-BF through E-Prime. They then completed the PD task. They were then debriefed and
awarded participation credit for an undergraduate course.
Data Analytic Plan
For each participant, cooperation, total point gain, and competitive point gain were
averaged across each half of each block. Total point gain acts as a measure of the PD game’s
first instructed goal (i.e., win as many points as they could) and competitive point gain acts as a
measure of the second instructed goal (i.e., win more points than their opponent). To investigate
the main effects and interactions of opponent condition, psychopathy factors, and first and
second half of opponent condition blocks across the entire experiment, analyses of covariance
(ANCOVAs) were run on participants’ cooperation, total point gain, and competitive point gain
using Huynh-Feldt corrections for non-sphericity. Any main effects or interactions that were not
statistically significant in the experiment as a whole were not included when analyzing results
after particular behavior by the participant or computer. For each level of opponent HarshnessLeniency, I collapsed across Consistent-Inconsistent conditions in analyses involving
psychopathy as I did not find any significant differences between these conditions regarding
psychopathy factors. I evaluated post hoc pairwise comparisons involving Harshness-Leniency
against a Sidak-corrected α level of .0085.
Significant main effects involving psychopathy were followed-up with partial
correlations to determine the sign of the effect, and significant interactions involving
psychopathy were decomposed with Steiger's (1980) t tests for dependent correlations across
conditions. Post-hoc bootstrapped mediational analyses (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) were
conducted with 5000 resamples to examine if participant cooperation mediated significant
relationships between psychopathy factors and total point gain or competitive point gain.
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To examine how participants’ gains and cooperation were affected by both their own
behavior (strategic trials) and their opponent’s behavior (reactive trials) on the previous trial,
participants’ cooperation, total point gain, and competitive point gain on the next trial after
participant cooperation or defection and computer opponent cooperation or defection were
computed. For each, ANCOVAs, partial correlations, and Steiger’s ts (1980) were run as
described above for the cooperation, total point gain, and competitive point gain across the
experiment. I used a Sidak-corrected α level of .013 to control for the four different sets of
comparisons. Some participants never cooperated (n = 2 in harsh conditions; n = 6 in lenient
conditions) or defected (n = 2 in harsh conditions; n = 3 in lenient conditions) in a given
condition, leading to missing data. To retain all participants in these analyses, each participant’s
mean total point gain, competitive point gain, and cooperation across all other conditions for
those missing cells were imputed. Also, the relationships were examined between psychopathy
and self-reported strategies through partial correlations between FD/IA and participants’ ratings
at the end of the experiment of a) how much they sought to gain the most points possible and b)
win by as large a margin as possible.
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Chapter 3: Results
Across Entire Experiment

Figure 5. Effects of strategy and Block Half on cooperation, total point gain, and competitive
point gain across the entire experiment. TG 1st = Total point gain first half; TG 2nd = Total point
gain second half; Coop 1st = Cooperation first half; Coop 2nd = Cooperation second half.

Cooperation.
Strategy. As diagrammed in Figure 5A, there was a significant main effect of opponent
Harshness-Leniency, F(2.99,473) = 16.4, p < .001, ηp2 = .09. There was an overall positive linear
relationship (linear F(1,158) = 37.3, p < .001, ηp2 = .19) between cooperation and leniency of
opponent strategy, though the difference between very and mildly lenient conditions was less
than that between all other pairs of conditions in this factor (quadratic F(1,158) = 4.13, p = .044,
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ηp2 = .03). Pairwise comparisons revealed a significant difference between all levels of HarshLenient opponent strategies, |t(160)|s > 3.00, ps < .02, except for between the mildly lenient and
both mildly harsh, t(160) = 2.39, p = .104, and very lenient conditions, t(160) = -0.08, p = .972.
There was significantly more cooperation in the first half of each block compared to the
second, F(1,158) = 194, p < .001, ηp2 = .55, as diagrammed in Figure 5B. One sample t-tests
revealed that means rates of cooperation in both the first, t(160) = 2.09, p = .039, d = .165, and
second, t(160) = -5.70, p < .001, d = -.449, half of each block were significantly different from
.50, the rate expected if participants chose to cooperate or defect randomly on each trial.
There was a significant interaction of opponent Harshness-Leniency x Block Half,
F(3,474) = 6.01, p = .001, ηp2 = .04. As diagrammed in Figure 5C, there was a difference
between block halves in the positive linear relationship of cooperation with strategic leniency
(linear opponent Harshness-Leniency x Block Half F(1,158) = 15.3, p < .001, ηp2 = .09) in which
the linear effect of opponent Harshness-Leniency was greater in the second half of each block,
F(1,158) = 47.6, p < .001, ηp2 = .23, than in the first block, F(1,158) = 15.1, p < .001, ηp2 = .09.
There was no significant main effect of Consistent-Inconsistent opponent strategy,
F(1,158) = 0.62, p = .432, ηp2 < .01, as diagrammed in Figure 5D. Therefore, in subsequent
analyses involving cooperation, I did not investigate Consistent-Inconsistent opponent strategy.
Psychopathy. There were no main effects or interactions (i.e., FD, IA, Block Half,
opponent Harshness-Leniency) involving with psychopathy with cooperation in the experiment
overall, Fs < 1.2, ps > .27, ηp2s < .01. Therefore, I only analyzed cooperation further to clarify
significant FD x Block Half effects on total point gain or FD x opponent Harshness-Leniency
effects on competitive point gain below.
Total point gain.
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Strategy. As diagrammed in Figure 5A, there was a significant main effect of opponent
Harshness-Leniency, F(2.29,364) = 228, p < .001, ηp2 = .59. There was an overall positive linear
relationship (linear F(1,158) = 374, p < .001, ηp2 = .70) between total point gain and leniency of
opponent strategy, though the difference between very harsh and mildly harsh conditions was
less than that between all other pairs of conditions in this factor (quadratic F(1,158) = 11.1, p =
.001, ηp2 = .07). Nevertheless, pairwise comparisons revealed a significant difference between all
levels of Harsh-Lenient opponent strategies, |t(160)|s > 6.00 , ps < .001.
There was significantly more total point gain in the first half of each block compared to
the second, F(1,158) = 275, p < .001, ηp2 = .64, as diagrammed in Figure 5B.
There was a significant interaction of opponent Harshness-Leniency x Block Half,
F(2.69,424) = 8.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .05. As diagrammed in Figure 5C, there was a difference
between block halves in the positive linear relationship of total point gain with strategic leniency
(linear opponent Harshness-Leniency x Block Half F(1,158) = 17.5, p < .001, ηp2 = .10) in which
the linear effect of opponent Harshness-Leniency was greater in the second half of each block,
F(1,158) = 321, p < .001, ηp2 = .67, than in the first half, F(1,158) = 313, p < .001, ηp2 = .67.
Finally, as diagrammed in Figure 5D, participants had significantly lower total point gain
in the inconsistent conditions than the consistent conditions, F(1,158) = 14.75, p < .001, ηp2 =
.09.
Psychopathy. There was a significant FD x Block Half effect on participants’ total point
gain, F(1,158) = 4.49, p = .036, ηp2 = .03. Though no partial correlations were significant
between FD and total point gain in the first or second half of blocks, they further revealed that
the first half of blocks, rp(158) = -.090, p = .255, had a more negative partial correlation than did
the second half of blocks, rp(158) = .013, p = .871, largely due to the high correlation between
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the first and second half of blocks, r(159) = .853, p < .001. No other main effects or interactions
(e.g., IA, Block Half, opponent Harshness-Leniency) involving psychopathy with total point gain
in the experiment overall were significant, Fs < 2.8, ps > .05, ηp2s < .02. Therefore, in
subsequent analyses involving total point gain, I only investigated the FD x Block Half
interaction.
Competitive point gain.
Strategy. As diagrammed in Figure 5A, there was a significant main effect of opponent
Harshness-Leniency, F(1.42,225) = 263, p < .001, ηp2 = .63. There was an overall positive linear
relationship (linear F(1,158) = 314, p < .001, ηp2 = .70) between competitive point gain and
leniency of opponent strategy, though the difference between very harsh and mildly harsh
conditions was less than that between all other pairs of conditions in this factor (quadratic
F(1,158) = 70.5, p = .001, ηp2 = .07). Nevertheless, pairwise comparisons revealed significant
differences between all levels of Harsh-Lenient opponent strategies, |t(160)|s > 6.70, ps < .001.
There was a significantly larger competitive point gain in the first half of each block
compared to the second, as diagrammed in Figure 5B, F(1,158) = 4.99, p = .027, ηp2 = .03.
Participants also had significantly lower competitive point gain in the inconsistent
conditions than the consistent conditions, as diagrammed in Figure 5D, F(1,158) = 57.9, p <
.001, ηp2 = .27.
There was no significant interaction of opponent Harshness-Leniency x Block Half,
F(2.31,366) = 0.22, p = .837, ηp2 < .01, as shown in Figure 5C. Therefore, in subsequent analyses
involving competitive point gain, I did not investigate this interaction.
Psychopathy. There was a significant interaction of FD x opponent Harshness-Leniency,
F(1.42,225) = 3.48, p = .048, ηp2 = .02. Though Steiger's (1980) t tests revealed no significant
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difference between each level of opponent Harshness-Leniency, |t(160)|s < 1.9, ps > .06, there
was a significant partial correlation between FD and the very lenient condition, r(158) = .181, p
= .022, but no other conditions, |r(158)|s < .10. No other main effects or interactions (e.g., IA,
Block Half) involving psychopathy with competitive point gain in the experiment overall were
significant, Fs < 3.9, ps > .06, ηp2s < .03. Therefore, in subsequent analyses involving
competitive point gain, I only investigated the effects of FD x opponent Harshness-Leniency.
Emotion and arousal ratings after each block. For valence ratings, there was a
significant main effect of opponent Harshness-Leniency, F(2.56,405) = 25.4, p < .001, ηp2 = .14.
The means and standard errors for each Harshness-Leniency condition were as follows: very
harsh M = 5.46, SE = 0.14, mildly harsh M = 5.74, SE = 0.13, mildly lenient M = 6.05, SE = 0.13,
very lenient M = 6.27, SE = 0.13. Thus, there was a positive linear relationship of leniency of
strategy, F(1,158) = 47.5, p < .001, ηp2 = .21, and significant differences between all conditions,
|t(160)|s > 2.4, p < .02, with mean values ranging from neutral to slightly positive valence. There
was no significant main effect of Consistent-Inconsistent opponent strategy, F(1,158) = 0.37, p =
.545, ηp2 < .01. There was a significant main effect of FD, F(1,158) = 4.66, p = .032, ηp2 = .03,
but not IA, F(1,158) = 0.11, p = .744, ηp2 < .01. FD correlated with valence ratings across all
conditions, rp(158) = .169, p = .032, but IA did not, rp(158) = -.026, p = .744.
For arousal ratings, there were no significant main effects of opponent HarshnessLeniency, F(2.84,449) = 0.69, p = .552, ηp2 < .01, Consistent-Inconsistent opponent strategy,
F(1,158) = 0.84, p = .362, ηp2 < .01, FD, F(1,158) = 0.57, p = .453, ηp2 < .01, or IA F(1,158) =
1.54, p = .217, ηp2 < .02, and there were no significant partial correlations with arousal ratings
for FD, r(158) = .060, p = .453, or IA, r(158) = .098, p = .217.
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Strategy ratings after entire experiment. There was no significant difference between
means of self-reported strategies of “gain the most points possible,” M = 5.29, SE = 0.19, and
“gain as many more points than your opponent as possible,” M = 5.67, SE = 0.18, t(160) = 1.41,
p = .160. There were no significant partial correlations of self-reported strategy with FD,
|rp(160)|s < .13, ps > .11, or IA, |rp(160)|s < .14, ps > .07.
Behavior after Participant’s Cooperation

Figure 6. Effects of strategy and Block Half on cooperation, total point gain, and competitive
point gain after participant cooperation on the previous trial. TG 1st = Total point gain first half;
TG 2nd = Total point gain second half; Coop 1st = Cooperation first half; Coop 2nd =
Cooperation second half.

Cooperation.
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Strategy. There was significantly more cooperation in the first half of each block
compared to the second half, F(1,157) = 41.5, p < .001, ηp2 = .21, as diagrammed in Figure 6B.
One sample t-tests revealed that means rates of cooperation in both the first, t(159) = 5.61, p <
.001, d = .444, and second, t(159) = 3.16, p = .002, d = .250, half of each block were
significantly greater than .50.
There was no significant main effect of opponent Harshness-Leniency, F(2.82,443) =
1.17, p = .321, ηp2 < .01, and no significant interaction of opponent Harshness-Leniency x Block
Half, F(2.91,458) = 2.05, p = .109, ηp2 = .01, as shown in Figures 6A and 6C, respectively.
Total point gain.
Strategy. As diagrammed in Figure 6A, there was a significant main effect of opponent
Harshness-Leniency, F(1.93,303) = 158, p < .001, ηp2 = .50. There was an overall positive linear
relationship (linear F(1,157) = 225, p < .001, ηp2 = .59) between total point gain and leniency of
strategy, though the difference between mildly lenient and very lenient conditions was less than
that between all other pairs of conditions in this factor (quadratic F(1,157) = 32.7, p < .001, ηp2 =
.17). Specifically, pairwise comparisons revealed a significant difference between all levels of
Harsh-Lenient opponent strategies, |t(159)|s > 7.5, ps < .001, except for between the mildly
lenient and very lenient conditions, t(159) = -0.99, p = .907.
Participants gained significantly fewer total points in the first half of each block
compared to the second half, F(1,157) = 8.94, p = .003, ηp2 = .05, as diagrammed in Figure 6B.
There was no significant interaction of opponent harness-leniency x Block Half,
F(2.44,383) = 1.04, p = .367, ηp2 < .01, as diagrammed in Figure 6C.
Participants also significantly more total points in the inconsistent conditions than the
consistent conditions, F(1,157) = 17.4, p < .001, ηp2 = .10, as shown in Figure 6D.
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Psychopathy. When correcting for multiple comparisons, the FD x Block Half effect on
participants’ total point gain was not significant after participants cooperated on the previous
trial, F(1,157) = 4.56, p = .034, ηp2 = .03.
Competitive point gain.
Strategy. As diagrammed in Figure 6A, there was a significant main effect of opponent
Harshness-Leniency, F(2.13,334) = 113, p < .001, ηp2 = .42. There was an overall positive linear
relationship (linear F(1,157) = 165, p < .001, ηp2 = .51) between competitive point gain and
leniency of opponent strategy, though the difference between mildly lenient and very lenient
conditions was less than that between all other conditions (quadratic F(1,157) = 18.8, p < .001,
ηp2 = .11). In particular, pairwise comparisons revealed a significant difference between all levels
of Harsh-Lenient opponent strategies, |t(159)|s > 7.40, ps < .001, except for between the mildly
lenient and very lenient conditions, t(159) = -0.59, p = .992.
There was a significant main effect of Block Half, F(1,157) = 26.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .14,
such that there was a significantly smaller competitive point gain in the first half of each block
compared to the second half, as diagrammed in Figure 6B.
When correcting for multiple comparisons the main effect of Consistent-Inconsistent
opponent strategy was not significant, F(1,157) = 4.93, p = .028, ηp2 = .03, as diagrammed in
Figure 6D.
Psychopathy. There was no significant interaction of FD x opponent Harshness-Leniency,
F(2.82,443) = 0.81, p = .485, ηp2 < .01.
Behavior after Participant’s Defection
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Figure 7. Effects of strategy and Block Half on cooperation, total point gain, and competitive
point gain after participant defection on the previous trial. TG 1st = Total point gain first half;
TG 2nd = Total point gain second half; Coop 1st = Cooperation first half; Coop 2nd =
Cooperation second half.

Cooperation.
Strategy. As diagrammed in Figure 7A, there was a significant main effect of opponent
Harshness-Leniency, F(2.71,428) = 37.3, p < .001, ηp2 = .20. There was an overall positive linear
relationship (linear F(1,158) = 78.6, p < .001, ηp2 = .33) between cooperation and leniency of
opponent strategy, though the difference between mildly and very lenient conditions was less
than that between all other pairs of conditions in this factor (quadratic F(1,158) = 5.11, p = .025,
ηp2 = .03). Indeed, pairwise comparisons revealed a significant difference between all levels of
Harsh-Lenient strategies, |t(160)|s > 3.90, ps < .01, except for between the mildly lenient and
very lenient conditions, t(160) = -0.60, p = .993.
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There was significantly more cooperation in the first half of each block compared to the
second half, F(1,158) = 144, p < .001, ηp2 = .48, as diagrammed in Figure 7B. One sample t-tests
revealed that means rates of cooperation in the second half of each block, t(160) = -13.6, p <
.001, d = -1.07, were significantly lower than .50, but not the first half, t(160) = -1.61, p = .109, d
= -.127.
There was no significant interaction of opponent harness-leniency x Block Half,
F(2.93,463) = 2.33, p = .075, ηp2 = .02, as shown in Figure 7C.
Total point gain.
Strategy. As diagrammed in Figure 7A, there was a significant main effect of opponent
Harshness-Leniency, F(1.90,299) = 339, p < .001, ηp2 = .68. There was an overall positive linear
relationship (linear F(1,158) = 494, p < .001, ηp2 = .76) between total point gain and leniency of
opponent strategy, though the difference between very and mildly harsh conditions was less than
that between all other pairs of conditions in this factor (quadratic F(1,158) = 190, p < .001, ηp2 =
.55). Indeed, pairwise comparisons revealed a significant difference between all levels of HarshLenient opponent strategies, |t(160)|s > 11.6, ps < .001, except for between the very harsh and
mildly harsh conditions, t(160) = 2.39, p = .809.
There was a significant main effect of Block Half, F(1,158) = 246, p < .001, ηp2 = .61.
Specifically, there was significantly more total point gain in the first half of each block compared
to the second half as shown in Figure 7B.
There was no significant interaction of opponent Harshness-Leniency x Block Half,
F(2.44,386) = 1.20, p = .306, ηp2 < .01, as diagrammed in Figure 7C.
There was a significantly lower total point gain in the inconsistent conditions than the
consistent conditions, F(1,158) = 138, p < .001, ηp2 = .47, as diagrammed in Figure 7D.
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Psychopathy. There was no FD x Block Half interaction, F(1,158) = 1.60, p =.208, ηp2 =
.01.
Competitive point gain.
Strategy. As shown in Figure 7A, there was a significant main effect of opponent
Harshness-Leniency, F(2.37,375) = 206, p < .001, ηp2 = .57, with an overall positive linear
relationship (linear F(1,158) = 341, p < .001, ηp2 = .68) between competitive point gain and
leniency of opponent strategy, though the slope of the difference between very and mildly harsh
conditions was slightly negative (quadratic F(1,158) = 178, p < .001, ηp2 = .53). Nevertheless,
pairwise comparisons revealed a significant difference between all levels of Harsh-Lenient
opponent strategies, |t(160)|s > 3.90, ps < .002, except for between the very harsh and mildly
harsh conditions, t(160) = 2.53, p = .075.
There was no significant main effect of Block Half, F(1,158) = 0.83, p = .363, ηp2 < .01,
as diagrammed in Figure 7B.
There was a significant main effect of Consistent-Inconsistent opponent strategy,
F(1,158) = 101, p < .001, ηp2 = .40, with a significantly more negative competitive point gain in
the inconsistent conditions than the consistent conditions, as diagrammed in Figure 7D.
Psychopathy. There was no significant interaction of FD x opponent Harshness-Leniency,
F(2.37,374) = 0.37, p = .728, ηp2 < .01.
Behavior after Computer’s Cooperation
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Figure 8. Effects of strategy and Block Half on cooperation, total point gain, and competitive
point gain after computer opponent cooperation on the previous trial. TG 1st = Total point gain
first half; TG 2nd = Total point gain second half; Coop 1st = Cooperation first half; Coop 2nd =
Cooperation second half.

Cooperation.
Strategy. There was significantly more cooperation in the first half of each block
compared to the second half, F(1,158) = 24.5, p < .001, ηp2 = .13, as diagrammed in Figure 8B.
One sample t-tests revealed that means rates of cooperation the first half of each block, t(160) =
2.75, p = .007, d = .217, were significantly greater than .50, but not the second half, t(160) =
0.60, p = .553, d = .047.
There was no significant main effect of opponent Harshness-Leniency, F(3,473) = 2.11, p
= .098, ηp2 = .01, or interaction of opponent harness-leniency x Block Half, F(3,480) = 1.09, p =
.353, ηp2 < .01, as diagrammed in Figure 8A and 8C respectively.
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Total point gain.
Strategy. As diagrammed in Figure 8A, there was a significant main effect of opponent
Harshness-Leniency, F(2.5,395) = 201, p < .001, ηp2 = .56. There was an overall positive linear
relationship (linear F(1,158) = 349, p < .001, ηp2 = .69) between total point gain and leniency of
opponent strategy, though the difference between very and mildly harsh conditions was less than
between all other pairs of conditions in this factor (quadratic F(1,158) = 77.0, p < .001, ηp2 =
.33). Indeed, pairwise comparisons revealed a significant difference between all levels of HarshLenient opponent strategies, |t(160)|s > 9.69, ps < .001, except for between the very harsh and
mildly harsh conditions, t(160) = 1.21, p = .785.
There was no significant main effect of Block Half, F(1,158) = 1.56, p = .214, ηp2 = .01,
as diagrammed in Figure 8B.
However, there was a significant interaction of opponent Harshness-Leniency x Block
Half, F(2.56,404) = 8.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .05. As diagrammed in Figure 8C, there was a
difference between halves in the positive linear relationship of total point gain with strategic
leniency (linear opponent Harshness-Leniency x Block F(1,158) = 15.0, p < .001, ηp2 = .09) in
which the linear effect of opponent Harshness-Leniency was greater in the first half of each
block, F(1,158) = 233, p < .001, ηp2 = .60, than in the second half, F(1,158) = 173, p < .001, ηp2
= .52.
Participants gained significantly fewer total points in the inconsistent conditions than the
consistent conditions, F(1,158) = 73.5, p < .001, ηp2 < .32, as diagrammed in Figure 8D.
Psychopathy. There was no FD x Block Half interaction, F(1,158) = 0.34, p = .564, ηp2 <
.01.
Competitive point gain.
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Strategy. As diagrammed in Figure 8A, there was a significant main effect of opponent
Harshness-Leniency, F(2.47,391) = 157, p < .001, ηp2 = .50. There was an overall generally
positive linear relationship (linear F(1,158) = 272, p < .001, ηp2 = .63) between competitive point
gain and leniency of opponent strategy, though the difference between very and mildly harsh
conditions was less than that between all other pairs of conditions in this factor (quadratic
F(1,158) = 69.8, p < .001, ηp2 = .31). Indeed, pairwise comparisons revealed a significant
difference between all levels of Harsh-Lenient opponent strategies, |t(160)|s > 7.70, ps < .001,
except for between the very harsh and mildly harsh conditions, t(160) = 0.11, p > .99.
There was a significantly smaller competitive point gain in the first half of each block
compared to the second, F(1,158) = 19.9, p < .001, ηp2 = .11, as diagrammed in Figure 8B.
Participants also earned significantly fewer points than their opponents in the inconsistent
conditions than the consistent conditions, F(1,158) = 65.0, p < .001, ηp2 = .29, as diagrammed in
Figure 8D.
Psychopathy. There was no main interaction of FD x opponent Harshness-Leniency,
F(2.47,391) = 1.22, p = .301, ηp2 < .01.
Behavior after Computer’s Defection
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Figure 9. Effects of strategy and Block Half on cooperation, total point gain, and competitive
point gain after computer opponent defection on the previous trial. TG 1st = Total point gain first
half; TG 2nd = Total point gain second half; Coop 1st = Cooperation first half; Coop 2nd =
Cooperation second half.

Cooperation.
Strategy. As diagrammed in Figure 9A, there was a significant main effect of opponent
Harshness-Leniency, F(2.95,461) = 34.8, p < .001, ηp2 = .18. There was an overall positive linear
relationship (linear F(1,156) = 83.8, p < .001, ηp2 = .35) between cooperation and leniency of
opponent strategy. Pairwise comparisons revealed a significant difference between all levels of
Harsh-Lenient opponent strategies, |t(158)|s > 3.10, ps < .02, except for between the mildly
lenient and very lenient conditions, t(158) = -2.12, p = .167.
There was significantly more cooperation in the first half of each block than the second
half, F(1,156) = 183, p < .001, ηp2 = .54, as diagrammed in Figure 9B. One sample t-tests
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revealed that mean rates of cooperation in the second half of each block, t(158) = -13.1, p < .001,
d = -1.04, were significantly less than .50, but not in the first half, t(158) = -0.85, p = .396, d = .067.
There was no significant interaction of opponent Harness-Leniency x Block Half,
F(2.96,462) = 2.09, p = .101, ηp2 = .01, as diagrammed in Figure 9C.
Total point gain.
Strategy. As diagrammed in Figure 9A, there was a significant main effect of opponent
Harshness-Leniency, F(2.38,371) = 128, p < .001, ηp2 = .45. There was an overall positive linear
relationship (linear F(1,156) = 244, p < .001, ηp2 = .61, between total point gain and leniency of
opponent strategy, though the difference between mildly and very lenient conditions was less
than that between all other pairs of conditions in this factor (quadratic F(1,156) = 7.64, p = .006,
ηp2 = .05). Specifically, pairwise comparisons revealed a significant difference between all levels
of Harsh-Lenient opponent strategies, |t(158)|s > 7.40, ps < .001, except for between the mildly
lenient and very lenient conditions, t(158) = -1.05, p = .878.
There was significantly more total point gain in the first half of each block compared to
the second half, F(1,156) = 190, p < .001, ηp2 = .55, as diagrammed in Figure 9B.
There was no significant interaction of opponent Harshness-Leniency x Block Half,
F(2.49,389) = 1.66, p = .185, ηp2 = .01, as diagrammed in Figure 9C.
There was no significant main effect of Consistent-Inconsistent opponent strategy,
F(1,156) = 0.25, p = .615, ηp2 < .01, as diagrammed in Figure 9D.
Psychopathy. There was no FD x Block Half interaction, F(1,156) = 1.89, p = .171, ηp2 =
.01.
Competitive point gain.
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Strategy. As diagrammed in Figure 9A, there was a significant main effect of opponent
Harshness-Leniency, F(2.74,428) = 38.2, p < .001, ηp2 = .20. There was an overall positive linear
relationship (linear F(1,156) = 79.5, p < .001, ηp2 = .34) between competitive point gain and
leniency of opponent strategy, though the slope of the difference between mildly and very lenient
conditions was slightly negative (quadratic F(1,156) = 5.24, p = .023, ηp2 = .03). Specifically,
pairwise comparisons revealed a significant difference between all levels of Harsh-Lenient
opponent strategies, |t(158)|s > 2.90, ps < .02, except between the mildly lenient and very lenient
conditions, t(158) = 0.79, p = .965.
There was no significant main effect of Block Half, F(1,156) = 0.37, p = .542, ηp2 < .01,
or of Consistent-Inconsistent opponent strategy, F(1,156) = 0.12, p = .728, ηp2 < .01, as
diagrammed in Figure 9B.
Psychopathy. There was no main interaction of FD x opponent Harshness-Leniency,
F(2.74,427) = 1.71, p = .168, ηp2 < .02.
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Chapter 4: Discussion
In an undergraduate sample playing iterated PD games against a variety of opponents
ranging from very harsh to very lenient in their interpersonal style, cooperation and point gains
showed various associations with opponent strategy, first versus second half of each block
comparisons, and psychopathy factors.
Strategy
Basic patterns. Across the experiment overall, cooperation decreased (with a large effect
size) from the first to the second half of each block, resulting in reduced total and competitive
point gains. This pattern is contrary to previous research that suggests the development of
cooperation is promoted through repeated interactions among players (Axelrod, 1984; Rand &
Nowak, 2013) particularly in longer finitely iterated PD games (Barlow & Tsang, 2015).
However, the rates of cooperation and subsequent gains are quite different when comparing
patterns of behavior after cooperation or after defection on the previous trial. Cooperation by
either the participant or the computer opponent seems to promote participant cooperation overall,
which supports previous findings that early cooperative game play promotes later cooperation
(Komorita & Mechling, 1967; Pilisuk et al., 1965; Sermat, 1967; Terhune, 1968). After
participant cooperation on the previous trial, participants cooperated significantly more than 50%
of the time in both halves. In contrast, after computer cooperation on the previous trial,
participants cooperated significantly more than 50% of the time in the first half of each block but
only about 50% of the time in the second half. Furthermore, they had greater more total point
gain (after participant cooperation on the previous trial) and more competitive point gain (after
both participant and computer cooperation on the previous trial). Thus, participants may have
selectively taken advantage of the elevated rates of cooperation to their benefit on the next trial.
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In comparison, defection by either the participant or the computer opponent appears to
promote participant defection. After both participant and computer defection on the previous
trial, participants cooperated less in the second half of each block. More specifically,
participants’ mean cooperation in the first half of each block was not substantially different than
50%, but in the second half of each block, their mean cooperation was significantly less than
50% (with large effect sizes). Additionally, along with cooperating less, participants earned less
total point gain (after participant defection on the previous trial) in the second half of each block.
Although there was no significant effect of Block Half for competitive point gain after
participant or computer defection, these were the only conditions in which competitive mean
gains in both halves were negative (i.e., computers earned more points than participants),
indicating that participants’ behavior after defection did not further their objectives in the PD.
Overall, these patterns of results suggest that the presence of cooperation or defection,
regardless of who (e.g., participant themselves or their computer opponent), promotes higher
rates of that behavior subsequently. However, effects across the experiment overall still suggest
there is still a reduction in cooperation in the second half of each when these patterns are
combined. Still, it appears that in trials after cooperation, participants are more likely to benefit
(e.g., earn more total or competitive point gains in the second half of each block) however, in
trails after defection the increase in defection is to their detriment (e.g., less total point gain in the
second half or no difference). Finally, when comparing cooperation rates between patterns after
participant and after computer behavior, it appears that participants are slightly more likely to
cooperate after their own cooperation than after computer’s and are slightly more likely to defect
after their own defection than after computer’s. However, given the similarities in the patterns
seen after participant and after computer behavior, it does not appear that participants overall are
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acting particularly strategically to their own behavior or in reaction to their opponent’s behavior
per se, but instead are more reactive to the general environment of cooperation or defection while
defecting more overall over time – sometimes beneficially, sometimes not.
Evaluating hypotheses. In the experiment overall, opponent leniency of strategy was
associated with increased participant cooperation and total and competitive point gains
supporting Hypotheses 1a and 1b and in contrast to Hypothesis 1c. This is in support of previous
research that highlighted the importance of opponent strategy to the development of cooperation
(Axelrod, 1984) and that more generous (Grim, 1996; Nowak, 1990; Nowak & Sigmund, 1993;
Wu & Axelrod, 1995) and more forgiving (Beaufils et al., 1996; O’ Riordan, 2000) strategies are
more successful in promoting cooperation. Additionally, participants’ feelings of pleasantness
during the experiment increased with the leniency of their opponents’ strategies, indicating they
may enjoy the interpersonal environment that more lenient opponents provided.
However, patterns again emerge when comparing effects after cooperation and after
defection. After both participant and computer defection, increased participant cooperation and
total and competitive point gains were all associated with opponent leniency in opposition to
Hypotheses 4 and in support of Hypothesis 5, respectively. In contrast, after both participant and
computer cooperation, there was no effect of opponent Harshness-Leniency on rates of
cooperation, in opposition to Hypotheses 3 and 6 respectively, yet more lenient opponents are
associated with increased total and competitive point gains. This pattern suggests that it is,
indeed, more likely that one will obtain greater gains against a more lenient opponent overall.
However, opponents who are more lenient will promote returning to cooperation on trials after
both participant and opponent defection, whereas after both participant and computer
cooperation, opponent Harshness-Leniency promotes neither cooperation nor defection.
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Interestingly, these patterns of results suggest that while leniency of opponent strategy (e.g.,
lenient opponents cooperate more often by definition) promotes cooperation, it is moderated by
the general tendency of increased defection over time.
Additionally, across the experiment overall, inconsistent opponent conditions were
associated with lower total (consistent with Hypothesis 2b) and competitive point gains (in
opposition to Hypothesis 2c), though it was not associated with cooperation (in contrast to
Hypothesis 2a and previous research; Axelrod, 1980a, 1980b). Inconsistent opponent strategies
were also associated with lower total and competitive point gains after participant defection and
after computer cooperation, but were associated with greater total point gain after participant
cooperation, whereas there was no effect for after computer defection. In all, these results
suggest that strategic clarity is less important than other features of opponent strategies in its
effects on PD behavior and outcomes.
Psychopathy
Across the experiment as a whole, FD and IA were not associated with increased
cooperation or defection, thus not supporting Hypothesis 8a. This is in contrast to previous
findings (Berg et al., 2013; Yamagishi et al., 2014; Mokros et al. 2008) of significant positive
associations between psychopathic traits and defection when played against generous
computerized or human opponents. Additionally, there were no consistent decreases in
cooperation across extreme conditions overall, which did not support Hypothesis 8d. In general,
there were no significant effects of opponent Harshness-Leniency, except with FD for
competitive point gain across the experiment overall, though Steiger’s (1980) ts did not further
reveal any significant differences between conditions and only one significant partial correlation
with FD (e.g., very lenient). These results suggests that effects with those high in psychopathic
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traits playing PD games across a variety of interpersonal styles may be relatively robust against
opponents’ behavioral patterns. Indeed, contrary to theoretical expectations, psychopathic traits
may neither confer a particular sensitivity to interpersonal behavior patterns nor allow consistent
exploitation of lenient behavior patterns.
Hypothesis 8b was also not supported as neither FD nor IA were associated with
competitive point gain across the experiment as expected. Additionally, the null results of IA and
total point gain indicate that Hypothesis 8c was not supported. However, FD had a significantly
less negative association with total point gain in the second half of each block across the
experiment overall, suggesting that they became more strategic as time went on. This contrasts
the Block Half trend seen in the results during the experiment overall, as participants tended to
earn fewer total points in the second half of each block. However, Hypotheses 9a and 9b were
also not supported, as there were no significant associations with FD or IA after participant
cooperation on the previous trial. There was a significant correlation between FD and selfreported valence ratings, but not IA, hinting that FD may be associated with an enjoyment of
competitive social interaction, even when performed against automated opponents.
Limitations and Future Directions
These results contrast the literature suggesting that longer iterated PD games promote the
development of cooperation (Barlow & Tsang, 2015) perhaps due to the differences in subjects,
as they used a computer simulation and the current study uses human participants playing against
computerized opponents. Future studies may investigate if even longer games would promote
cooperation over time or if these results would replicate in human participants playing against
other live human opponents.
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Further research should also vary the length of the iterated PD games to examine when
individuals high in FD or IA shift in their behavior. Additionally, the longer iterated game used
in the current study allowed us to look at more strategic patterns of behavior than either one-shot
or short iterated PD games, though both versions of these games have yet to be compared in the
same study with psychopathy. Future studies may also further investigate the effect of different
opponent strategies on the association between psychopathic traits and cooperation/gains given
the surprising small and nonspecific effect of strategy seen in the current study, perhaps using
different operationalizations of Harsh-Lenient interpersonal styles or different strategies
altogether (e.g., stochastic strategies).
A limitation to the current study was the use of an undergraduate sample from a private
university. Future research should use a similar iterated PD game in a clinical or criminal
population to both investigate if this is unique to non-criminal populations and to consider if
these implications could benefit a clinical population. Though the magnitudes of the effect sizes
were consistent with the broader literature, they were still small, making premature any practical
or clinical implications of this work. Additionally, previous studies have used a mix of real
versus computerized opponents. While computerized opponents were necessary to investigate
the role that opponent harshness played in this paradigm, future studies should investigate if
harshness of human opponents has an effect on participant gains or cooperation in a PD game.
Furthermore, other games (e.g., the Ultimatum Game) may further elucidate the effects that
psychopathy factors have on multistep social interactions (Press & Dyson, 2012).
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